Abstract
I. Introduction
Democracies often tinker with mechanisms of constitutional governance. One of the current topics debated regarding such mechanisms is how involved legislatures should be in the constitutional assessment of laws. While some jurisdictions display strong  Lecturer in Public Law, Liverpool Hope University. The author wishes to thank Yen-Tu Su (Institutum Iurisprudentiae, Academia Sinica) for his insightful comments throughout the writing of this piece, and also Ying-Fan Liao, for her excellent research assistance. Any errors are the author's alone. The author can be reached at: brianchristopherjones@gmail.com. put more faith in governmental institutions and the political process, although ' [q]uite sensibly, few countries put all of their eggs in one basket '. 5 This article focuses on Taiwan, who may indeed have all of their eggs in one basket. 6 Taiwan's Constitutional Court (or 'Council of Grand Justices') incorporates strong judicial review and the legislature has limited formal mechanisms by which to assess the constitutionality of the bills and laws it scrutinises. Although Taiwan officially operates on a Presidential system, in reality it is more of a hybrid between parliamentary and presidential (that is, 'semi-presidential'). 7 Lately there have been calls to officially change the system to a Parliamentary model, but little movement on this has occurred. thirds of the way to what took the US Supreme Court two centuries to achieve. Furthermore, challenging and striking down legislative provisions does not appear to be abating: in 2013, the Constitutional Court declared eight laws, or provisions of laws, unconstitutional.
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Here it is contended that Taiwan is currently too heavily focused on legal constitutionalism, thus hindering the constitutional assessment of bills travelling through the legislative process. This over-focus on legal constitutionalism was seen in the author's interviews with lawmakers and staffers of the Legislative Yuan, presented below. Though formal and practical barriers stand in the way, Taiwan's legislature possesses the necessary means by which to increase the institution's constitutional interpretative authority, should the body choose to do so. In fact, legislatures in democratic systems may well demand such an increase in authority.
14 The article unfolds in the following manner. First, it briefly discusses the complexities of comparing law-making systems, noting differences between Taiwan's constitutional structure and the other institutions consulted in this article. Next, it talks about constitutional review generally and interpretive authority for legislatures specifically, focusing on the UK Parliament, the US Congress and other legislatures. Then, it
incorporates an empirical component, using interview material obtained from Taiwanese
Legislative Yuan insiders to address whether and how lawmakers and their staff think about and assess the constitutionality of the laws they are drafting and voting on. Finally, the article offers proposals on how to enhance the interpretative authority of the Legislative Yuan, with the hope of striking more of a balance between legal and political constitutionalism.
Before this, however, a short note on the paper's comparative methodology is in 
B. Legislative interpretative authority
Most theories of constitutionalism acknowledge the legislature's interpretative authority, although such power varies by jurisdiction. 48 That being said, de Visser writes that the study of parliamentary constitutional interpretation is 'still in its infancy'. 49 Parliamentary or congressional scrutiny of constitutional issues can arise or be supported because of many different rationales. In some cases this stems from a pledge by lawmakers upon taking office to uphold the constitution, 50 actively scrutinising the constitutionality of bills travelling through parliament (for example, the Westminster Parliament's Lords Constitution Committee) or even merely from the duty of enacting bills into laws.
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Inevitably legislators are constitutional actors; but unfortunately, sometimes they are not viewed as constitutional reviewers.
Often the primary issue with enhanced constitutional scrutiny by legislatures is the complex interplay with the responsibilities of the judiciary. 52 This is especially true in jurisdictions employing strong judicial review and a reliance on legal constitutionalism.
Here legislatures are more likely to be stymied by the judiciary or impede themselves regarding their constitutional review efforts, rather than be aided by the judiciary as to how improvement could be made or responsibilities shared. Nonetheless, for jurisdictions that continue to employ strong judicial review, the 'countermajoritarian difficulty' ominously lingers. 104 Surprisingly, judicial review enforcement of the covenants was lacking.
Given the wide substantive nature of both covenants, their enactment may provide the Legislative Yuan and other non-judicial governmental entities with increased constitutional review authority. In particular, the implementing law notes that:
All levels of governmental institutions and agencies should review laws, regulations, directions and administrative measures within their functions according to the two Covenants. All laws, regulations, directions and administrative measures incompatible to the two Covenants should be amended within two years after the Act enters into force by new laws, law amendments, law abolitions and improved administrative measures.
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The deadline for reviews by governmental agencies was December 2011 and a December 2012 report by a local NGO states that while some action by the Executive has taken place, 'the pace of review is clearly lagging behind, for which the executive and the legislature should bear joint responsibility'. 106 The report goes on to single out the Legislative Yuan, explicitly noting its 'agencies have not been checking for laws or administrative measures that violate the covenants'. 107 While the Legislative Yuan still does not contain any official procedure by which the two covenants are assessed against pending legislation, remedying this situation is discussed in more detail below. (1) When drafting or proposing legislation, do you think about whether the statute is constitutional?
III. Legislative Yuan Insider Responses

A. Interview details
(2) If you do have questions regarding the constitutionality of a statute, who do you ask, and/or who resolves these matters?
The first question seeks to determine if legislators conscientiously assess constitutionality during the drafting process, while the second asks a more substantive question: where do legislators go with constitutional questions.
B. Thinking about constitutionality
Some insiders proclaimed to actively think about constitutionality. For instance, one legislator noted, 'I have more concern on human rights, democracy, and the constitutional 108 Most of these interviews were conducted in Chinese via an interpreter. Thus, the original answers have been twice translated from Chinese to English by research assistants and the most logical and accurate compilations were used. Should the original Chinese translations be desired, these can be proffered. structure or concept of constitutionalism ... so when I propose a bill, I will specifically make sure these concerns are being observed'. 109 A couple of assistants supported this notion, one adding, 'we will find constitutional law or the Grand Judges' interpretation to support our argument', 110 while the other noted, 'Yes, constitutionality is very fundamental, all the assistants and the experts take it into account'.
111
However, what the author tended to see more with this question was an assumed constitutionality, where insiders took for granted the constitutional content of their proposals. Even though many aspects of Taiwan's Constitution remain exceedingly divisive, one legislator answered, 'Oh, it always has to be within our constitutional framework, yeah-It's not really that controversial. I mean our constitutional principles are quite clear'. 112 Given the rate at which the Constitutional Court has struck down legislation in recent years, 113 it was surprising to hear one assistant state that 'it's impossible for us to present unconstitutional bills … It's common sense to know whether it's constitutional or not while drafting'. 114 Further, another staffer noted that 'Taiwan has a written law system and we strictly follow the levels of law, Constitutional Law, and other provisions. If the law or the authorising law are unconstitutional, it will be considered a joke'. 115 Given the difficulty of assessing constitutionality in many cases, however, the disparaging of a particular proposal may not necessarily kill it or easily render it illegitimate. Finally, in connection with assumed constitutionality, one assistant stated, 'yes, while another peculiarly added, 'when a law is unconstitutional, it's actually not too difficult to understand'. 122 Further, an experienced assistant noted:
Sometimes, legislators do not care about the constitutionality or whether it's going to pass or not; they care more about media exposure or whether certain groups feel that the legislator is contributing something for them. In our office, we pay much attention to the fundamental constitutional rules as much as possible.
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Exhibiting signs of judicial overhang, a few participants displayed overt nods to It is paramount to check if all the laws conform to the constitution, human rights, and this is especially true after we ratified ICCPR and ICESCR. There should be an organisation to monitor that all the passed law conforms to the standards of constitutions and conventions. However, there is currently no such organisation. We always hope to transform this system.
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From the interviewees' answers above it is apparent that Legislative Yuan insiders do not have a well-developed sense of constitutional interpretative authority as bills are travelling through the legislative process. Importantly, the legislature lacks any formal mechanisms that may either enhance constitutional scrutiny or spark constitutional debate and some interviewees displayed overt evidence of judicial overhang. Thus, the following section provides proposals for the Legislative Yuan and the Constitutional Court going forward.
IV. Proposals for the Legislative Yuan and the Constitutional Court
Below specific recommendations are provided that hopefully increase the Legislative Yuan's interpretative authority, and in doing so, increases Taiwan's political constitutionalism. Three of the proposals solely concern the parliament, while the final suggestions affect the Constitutional Court.
A. Legislative Yuan proposals
First, the implementation of a legislative or parliamentary counsel that can aid legislators in drafting and scrutinising legislation should be established. Interviewees revealed that they often get outside help for drafting bills, such as from law professors or from NGOs.
Although the legislature is relatively young, it was a bit surprising to find the Legislative Given the importance of the previous section two and current section six appointment articles, two changes need to occur going forward: (1) more nominations to the Constitutional Court should be made from those with elected political experience in general (preferably from the Legislative Yuan); and (2) the Constitutional Court should formally acknowledge the Legislative Yuan also contains some amount, however limited, of constitutional review powers. As noted above, merely having one branch of government as sole constitutional adjudicators is unhealthy for a fully-functioning democracy.
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Upholding the constitution involves multiple branches and actors and it is the interplay between these entities that determines a country's constitutional foundation.
Acknowledging this would help bridge the wide divide between political and legal constitutionalism in Taiwan, and decrease the inherent problems of the countermajoritarian difficulty.
It should also be emphasised that many of the Court's foundational opinions and expansion of judicial review powers occurred before the Legislative Yuan was fully elected.
While it may prove more appropriate to constrain and consolidate the powers of other governmental branches during a period of autocratic leadership, it is quite another to continue to do so when the legislature and the president are democratically elected.
Continuing with the precedents and doctrine established in the provincial period, without a thorough re-examination of some major opinions, is troubling and unhealthy to democracy; the reality of an elected legislature passing laws through the will of the people should be fully taken into consideration by the Court.
C. Barriers to reform
While at least some reform is necessary in Taiwan, many barriers may prevent it. First, members of the Legislative Yuan may find the above proposals unnecessary. Such are the effects of judicial overhang. Perhaps legislators believe their constitutional review scrutiny already operates at acceptable levels or perhaps they feel that constitutional review does not form part of their remit. This may indeed be the case, given the constitutional and statutory provisions that explicitly state the role of the Judicial Yuan in interpreting the Constitution.
145
Of course, the above recommendations also contain budget and legislative processes constraints. The introduction of a parliamentary counsel would indeed require necessary appropriations, and the introduction of a constitutional committee would require a significant amount of resources to be allocated. The committee would have to be staffed and worked into the operation of the Legislative Yuan and the practicalities of the constitutional committee and how those would operate would also have to be taken into consideration. Also, some of the ideas may not structurally fit into the Legislative Yuan.
Westminster and Congress are both bicameral and Taiwan's legislature is unicameral. 
V. Conclusion
Whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or spoken laws, it is he who is truly the lawgiver, to all intents and purposes, and not the person who first wrote or spoke them.
